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SSI and the Well-Being
of the Elderly Poor
Kathleen McGarry
Social Security has done much to improve the well-being of the elderly,
particularly the well-being of the poorest among the old. In 1960 approxi-
mately 35 percent of those aged sixty-ﬁve and over lived in poverty; today
that ﬁgure is below 11 percent. Much of this decline has been attributed
to increases in Social Security. Social Security has also improved the lives
of our elderly citizens by other measures. In 1960, 40 percent of elderly
widows lived with their children, but by 1990 less than 20 percent did so.
This shift toward independent living has been viewed as a positive out-
come of the increased income of the elderly. Labor force participation
among older male workers has also fallen to roughly half of its 1960 rate,
ap henomenon that has again been attributed by manyr esearchers to the
growth in Social Security.
Despite these gains, there remains a sizable fraction of the population
forw hom Social Security and other retirement resources do not provide
an adequate standard of living. For these individuals, beneﬁts are available
from the Supplemental Social Security Income program (SSI), which pro-
vides a guaranteed income for all those aged sixty-ﬁve and over, as well as
the blind and the disabled. Conditional on suﬃciently low assets, there
should be no elderly individual with monthly income below $484 (in 1997
dollars) or married couple with income below $726. In reality, however,
many of the poor are not enrolled in SSI and subsist on incomes below
these levels. In order to improve the well-being of the elderly, it is therefore
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49imperative that we ﬁrst understand how SSI functions and what changes
might be made to improve the ﬁnancial situation of the eligible population.
As the nation considers changes in Social Security, concurrent changes in
SSI might be well-advised. Successful linkage of the two programs and
implementation of any changes require a clear understanding of the cur-
rent system and an investigation of the costs and consequences of such
changes. Furthermore, analyses of the impact of Social Security reforms
on the well-being of the poorest among the elderly strongly depend on the
interaction of the two programs.
In this chapter I ﬁrst describe the SSI program in its current form, focus-
ing exclusively on the beneﬁts and regulations applicable to the elderly. I
use data from the Asset and Health Dynamics Study to examine the be-
havior of a population of elderly individuals with respect to the program
guidelines and then hypothesize what modiﬁcations to the SSI program
might be introduced and how these changes would alter poverty rates and
program costs. I then discuss the relationship between Social Security and
SSI and how the characteristics of the SSI program would alter the distri-
butional impact of various Social Security reforms.
2.1 Description of the Supplemental Security Income
2.1.1 Program Overview1
The Social Security Act of 1935 established a mechanism whereby the
federal government would assist states in providing cash assistance to the
poor; for the poor elderly, this assistance came from state-run old age assis-
tance (OAA) programs. In 1972 legislation was passed that replaced these
state-run plans with the federal Supplemental Security Income Program,
administered by the Social Security Administration (SSA).2 In contrast to
the state programs, which typically assessed individual need on a case by
case basis, the federal SSI program provides a guaranteed income to all
eligible individuals. In 1997 the income guarantees were $484 per month
foras ingle individual living in his own home, and $726 for a couple. These
amounts are reduced by one-third if the recipient lives in someone else’s
home and are adjusted yearly for inﬂation. For individuals with no other
income, the income guarantee is the actual beneﬁt they receive from SSI.
For those with other sources of income, the SSI beneﬁt is the diﬀerence
between the income guarantee and their countable income. Countable in-
come is distinct from current income in that the SSI program disregards
somep ortion ofap otential recipient’s income. The disregards vary by in-
1. The information in this section is drawn primarily from the Social Security Administra-
tion (1997, 1999).
2. The SSI program also took the place of the state-run assistance programs of Aid to the
Blind and Aid to the Permanently and Totally Disabled.
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sis, are the ﬁrst $20 of unearned income (most likely Social Security bene-
ﬁts), the ﬁrst $65 of earned income, and one-half of other earned income.3
Because of the disregards, those eligible for SSI can have income somewhat
above the guarantee, but no participant should have income below this
legislated amount.
An asset test is also required for participation in SSI. To be eligible for
beneﬁts, individuals must have countable assets of less than $2,000, and
couples must have less than $3,000. With respect to the determination of
countable assets, the disregards are substantial. Most importantly, an
owner-occupied home regardless of value and a car worth less than $4,500
aree x cluded.4
In addition to the federal program, states have the option of oﬀering
supplemental beneﬁts. In 1997, twenty-six states oﬀered supplements to
elderly individuals (or couples) living independently, and a total of forty-
four states oﬀered at least some form of supplemental beneﬁts, including
payments aimed speciﬁcally at the blind, the disabled or those with partic-
ular medical needs. With these supplements, the beneﬁts available to in-
dividuals can vary substantially across states. For example, the income
guarantee for a couple living in California in 1997 was $1,122.20 ($396.20
above the federal level), while in New York the income guarantee for a
couple was $828.50. If states choose to follow the same eligibility guide-
lines as the federal program with respect to such issues as the determina-
tion of countable income and assets, the SSA will administer the supple-
mental program on behalf of the state. If a state is willing to administer
itso wn program, it is free to alter the eligibility requirements as it wishes,
including imposing more (or less) stringent income and asset tests and
providing supplemental beneﬁts to only a subset of the population eligible
for SSI (e.g., those with speciﬁc medical needs).5
Those eligible for SSI are also likely to be entitled to beneﬁts from other
programs. SSI recipients are eligible for food stamps in all states except
California.6 Also, SSI recipients in most states are categorically eligible
forM edicaid and need ﬁle no other application to receive these beneﬁts.7
3. If there is less than $20 unearned income, additional earned income can be disregarded.
Other disregards are irregularly or infrequently received income of less than $20 per month,
home energy assistance payments, tuition beneﬁts, disaster relief, and the value of food
stamps.
4. Other exclusions are life insurance with a face value of less than $1,500, burial plots,
and household furnishings of less than $2,000.
5. In 1997, twenty-seven states administered their own supplemental programs, eleven
states had programs administered by the Social Security Administration, ﬁve reported both
levels of administration, and one supplemental program was administered at the county level
(seven states had no optional supplemental program).
6. California incorporates the value of food stamps into its monthly beneﬁt.
7. Forty states used SSI program guidelines to determine Medicaid eligibility. The re-
maining states used diﬀerent criteria.
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makes participation in the SSI program much more valuable.
Despite these potential beneﬁts, the majority of SSI recipients remain
poor. In 1997 the poverty lines for elderly singles and couples were $641.5
and $809.33 per month, somewhat above the federal SSI guarantees. Be-
cause of the existence of income disregards, particularly the larger disre-
gard for earned income, some of those receiving SSI will have their in-
comes increased above the poverty line by the federal beneﬁt. However,
for the most part, the federal SSI program will have little eﬀecto np overty
rates. In contrast, the supplemental programs in some states are suﬃ-
ciently generous that they do guarantee income above the poverty line.
Income guarantees in 1997 were above the poverty level for singles in three
states and for couples in twelve states. In addition, when the income disre-
gards are taken into account, individuals in many other states may also
have their total incomes raised beyond the poverty line. I examine this
issue further in section 2.2.4.
2.1.2 Participation in Supplemental Security Income
One of the more surprising aspects of SSI is that many of those entitled
to beneﬁts are not enrolled in the program. Several earlier studies have
demonstrated that only slightly more than one-half of those who appear
to be eligible for SSI are actually receiving beneﬁts (Menefee, Edwards,
and Schieber 1981; McGarry 1996). These participation rates are lower
than those found for the former Aid to Families with Dependent Children
(AFDC) program (Fraker and Moﬃtt 1988) and roughly comparable with
more recent evidence on participation in the food stamp program (Blank
and Ruggles 1996).8
The literature has oﬀered several hypotheses to explain this nonpartic-
ipation. (See Warlick 1979 for a detailed discussion of the various argu-
ments.)I thas been proposed that those who do not participate are not
aware of the program or that the process of applying for beneﬁts is too
challenging either physically or intellectually. Alternatively,i thas been
suggested that the stigma attached to the receipt of welfare outweighs the
value of the beneﬁts (Moﬃtt 1983). Below I brieﬂy investigate the corre-
lates of nonparticipation for a sample of SSI-eligible individuals.9 When
considering the eﬀectiveness of the SSI program in achieving its goal of a
guaranteed minimum income, one must keep in mind these low participa-
tion rates. Similarly, analyses of the eﬀecto fchanges in the SSI program
on the distribution of income and program costs must account for changes
in both eligibility and participation.
8. Fraker and Moﬃt (1988) estimated much lower food stamp participation rates than did
Blank and Ruggles (1996), 38 percent versus approximately 60 percent.
9. Menefee,E d wards, and Schieber (1981), Warlick (1982), Coe (1985), and McGarry
(1996) address this issue in detail.
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2.2.1 Asset and Health Dynamics Study Data
Iu se data from the Asset and Health Dynamics Study (AHEAD) to
analyze the distributional aspects of the SSI program and its potential to
aﬀect the well-being of the elderly poor.10 AHEAD provides a nationally
representative sample of the population born in 1923 or earlier and their
spouses. The respondents were ﬁrst interviewed in 1993, when the age-
eligible portion of the sample was approximately seventy years old or over.
Thee ntire sample consists of 8,222 individuals in 6,048 households.11 The
analyses presented here will use a single individual or marriedc o uple as
the unit of analysis, and I will refer to each observation as a family unit.12
AHEAD is ideal for this study because it contains a large sample of indi-
viduals, nearly all of whom meet the age requirements for SSI eligibility, as
well as detailed information on income and assets that allows for accurate
determination of eligibility based on the income and asset criteria.13 This
project also draws on a supplemental restricted use data ﬁle that contains
geographic identiﬁers for the AHEAD respondents. Because SSI beneﬁts
can vary widely across states, this information is necessary if potential
beneﬁts are to be properly imputed. Below I note the diﬀerence in eligibil-
ity when state programs are ignored.
2.2.2 Eligibility
I determine eligibility for federal SSI beneﬁts using the speciﬁc rules of
the program as they existed in 1993, including both the income and asset
tests (Social Security Administration 1993). The federal guarantees in that
year were $422 and $633 for singles and couples.14 I then calculate the
amount of a state supplement to which the family unit (single individual
10. A detailed description of the survey is available in Soldo et al. (1997).
11. Included in these numbers are 189 spouses below age sixty-ﬁve who would not them-
selves be eligible for SSI, regardless of income. However, because federal law requires that a
portion of the income of an age-ineligible spouse be deemed to the SSI applicant, it is impor-
tant that these individuals be kept in the sample and their incomes known.
12. In some cases, other individuals are present in the household; these could be children,
other relatives, or nonrelatives. The SSI program does not count the income of these other
individuals when determining the beneﬁt to which the eligible unit is entitled, but the income
guarantees are reduced by one-third if the potentially eligible unit lives in the household of
another. In my calculation of beneﬁts I, too, impose this one-third reduction. In all other
respects, I ignore these other individuals; I do not count their income when considering the
poverty status of the individual or couple, nor do I use their presence to determine the appro-
priate poverty line.
13. Many earlier studies of participation in welfare programs did not have asset informa-
tion and imputed asset eligibility based on income from assets.
14. A portion of the AHEAD sample was interviewed in 1994. Because the income mea-
sures refer to the preceeding month, I use 1994 SSI rules for all those interviewed after
January 1994. The federal guarantees in 1994 were $446 and $669 (SSA 1994).
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the guidelines of the SSI program particular to that state. The calculation
of countable income is based on reports of monthly income in AHEAD,
subtracting the appropriate disregards for earned and unearned income.
In addition to the standard disregards, I exclude transfers received from
family members or other individuals, because it is unlikely that these
transfers are received with suﬃcientr egularity to be reported to the gov-
ernment and included in countable income.
With respect to calculating asset eligibility, I am again able to follow the
program guidelines nearly exactly. I exclude the value of the home, up to
$1,500 in life insurance, and up to $4,500 in vehicle equity (the limit on
the value of a car).15
Table 2.1 compares income and asset eligibility. The ﬁrst part of the
table reports the percentage of the sample that is eligible for either federal
or state SSI, based on the application of the income and asset tests alone
and jointly. It is apparent from these numbers that the income limits are
much more likely to be binding than are the asset limits. Of the sample,
29.22 percent have countable assets below the SSI limits, while only 12.77
percent have income that is suﬃciently low. Combining the two criteria,
8.75 percent of family units are eligible for beneﬁts from federal and/or
state SSI programs.
The characteristics of the 4 percent of the sample that are income eligi-
bleb ut not asset eligible merit discussion. Seventy-nine percent of these
units have incomes below the poverty line (not shown), and in that sense
seemt omerit assistance, yet their wealth holdings prevent them fromr e-
ceiving any beneﬁts. Thus, even if the income guarantees were raised to
the poverty line and all eligible individuals participated in SSI, a fraction
of the population would remain poor, at least until their assets were de-
pleted. The wealth holdings of this group of income eligibles/asset inelig-
ibles arer elatively high: Mean wealth is $168,486 ($103,756 if housing
wealth is excluded). Only 9 percent of this subsample have countable as-
sets less than twice the limits set by SSI, while 23 percent have countable
assets of over $100,000. Thus the asset test does serve to limit the partici-
pation of those who can ﬁnance some consumption with current wealth.
The state supplemental programs play a large role in increasing eligibil-
ityr elative to the federal guidelines. The second part of table 2.1 highlights
the eﬀect by reporting the proportion of the sample eligible for SSI based
15. With respect to the exclusion of a car, I am unable to identify precisely its actual value.
AHEAD obtains the value of all vehicles (cars, boats, motorcycles, etc.) in a single question.
Ther e spondent may therefore own more than one car, or may own other vehicles that would
be included in countable assets, although this is unlikely for those with little in the way of
other assets or income. The survey also does not ask about the value of household furnish-
ings, so these are presumed to be less than the $2,000 limit allowed under SSI and not in-
cluded as part of countable assets.
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12.8 when state supplements are included to 9.9 percent, and the fraction
eligible after both the income and asset tests falls to 7 percent. The state
supplemental programs thus serve to increase the eligible population by
24 percent.
2.2.3 Characteristics of Participants
When examining actual participation for the families in the sample, I
ﬁnd the same low participation rates observed in other studies. Participa-
tion status is unknown for 11 of the 685 eligible units. Of the remaining
674 units, 392 report that theya re receiving beneﬁts. When appropriately
weighted,16 these numbers imply a participation rate of 55.9 percent. Sur-
prisingly, this rate is nearly identical to the 55 percent participation rate
found in the 1973 and 1974 Survey of Low-Income Aged and Disabled
(Menefee, Edwards, and Schieber 1981) and the 56 percent participation
rate in the 1984 Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP;
McGarry 1996).
Although the participation rate matches those of past studies, recent
evidence suggests that estimates of participation in welfare programs from
survey data may be downward biased due to underreporting of the receipt
of beneﬁts (see Bavier 1999). While it is obviously diﬃcult to assess the
16. AHEAD oversampled individuals in heavily black and Hispanic neighborhoods, so
weighting is necessary to achieve population representative statistics.
Table 2.1 Income and Asset Eligibility
Asset Test
Income Test Ineligible Eligible Total
Eligibility using federal and state criteria
Ineligible 66.75 20.47 87.23
(3,709) (1,416) (5,125)
Eligible 4.02 8.75 12.77
(238) (685) (923)
Total 70.78 29.22 100.00
(3,947) (2,101) (6,048)
Using federal criteria only
Ineligible 67.93 22.18 90.11
(3,769) (1,520) (5,289)
Eligible 2.85 7.04 9.89
(178) (581) (759)
Total 70.78 29.22 100.00
(3,947) (2,101) (6,048)
Source: All tables are from author’s calculations.
Notes: Percentages of all family units (weighted ﬁgures). Total numbers of family units in
parentheses (unweighted).
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that it may be an important phenomenon. Giannarelli and Wheaton (2000)
estimate that the Current Population Survey (CPS) captures approxi-
mately 75 percent of SSI receipts. Comparisons of reported beneﬁts pre-
sented here with administrative records also indicate underreporting.17
However, despite the likely biases, there are several reasons to believe that
underreporting does not alter the conclusion that a large fraction of eligible
individuals fails to enroll. First, SSI enrollment ﬁgures are far below those
predicted by the SSA from its data (Kennedy 1982). Second, consistent
with the results of survey data, outreach studies have found large numbers
of eligible nonparticipants but have had little success in increasing enroll-
ment (Comptroller General 1976). Finally, the similarity between the par-
ticipation rate found here and that observed in SIPP is notable because
SIPP is believed have unusually accurate reporting of income sources and,
in particular, more complete reporting of SSI income than the CPS (Kal-
ton, McMillen, and Kasprzyk 1986). However, to the extent that the re-
ceipt of SSI is underreported in AHEAD, the participation rate is an un-
derestimate of the true probability of participation in the program, and
costs and enrollment ﬁgures will also be biased downward.
Table 2.2 presents the means of several variables used in the subsequent
analyses. I examine the characteristics of three distinct groups: those who
are ineligible for SSI, those who are eligible and receiving beneﬁts, and
those who are eligible but not collecting these beneﬁts.18 The ineligible sub-
sample is obviously better oﬀ in virtually every dimension than either of
the other two groups, and their mean values are reported mainly for pur-
posesofcomparison.Meanincomeforthisgroup,exclusiveofSSI,is$1,915
per month, and their net worth is $195,142, or $118,952 when housing
17. The 1998 Green Book (U.S. House of Representatives 1998) cites an SSI participation
rate of 56.3 for the elderly, nearly identical to that estimated here. However, the participation
rates tabulated in the Green Book count the fraction of the elderly poor receiving SSI beneﬁts,
rather than the fraction of the eligible population. Because some elderly poor are likely to be
ineligible for SSI due to asset holding, and some with incomes above the poverty line are
likely to be eligible, given state supplements and income disregards, this measure is imprecise.
However, if I calculate a similar statistic for the AHEAD sample (the fraction of those with
income below the poverty line who report receiving SSI beneﬁts) I ﬁnd a participation rate
of only 28 percent. The substantially lower level of reported beneﬁts found with AHEAD
relative to that using administrative records indicates that there may be a good deal of non-
reporting of SSI beneﬁts. The discussion of table 2.6 below indicates a similarly important
degree of nonreporting with a comparison of payments. (In addition to underreporting of
recipiency, there are several other factors aﬀecting the comparisons between AHEAD and
SSA data, all of which are likely to play a role. First, the AHEAD sample is representative
of the noninstitutional population aged seventy and over, rather than all those aged sixty-
ﬁve and over. Second, the deﬁnitions of poverty diﬀer somewhat (see note 22); third, the
AHEAD estimates are based on SSI units rather than individuals; and, ﬁnally, the AHEAD
estimates use monthly rather than yearly measures of poverty status and recipiency.)
18. Among the ineligible population, 1.3 percent report income from SSI. Some of these
individuals are likely misclassiﬁed due to reporting error, but others may actually be receiving
beneﬁts to which they are not entitled. The SSA (1982) has estimated that 4 percent of those
receiving beneﬁts are actually ineligible.





Monthly pre-SSI income ($) 1,915 288 429
(41.0) (11.1) (19.6)
Calculated SSI beneﬁt ($) 0.0 223 156
(0.0) (9.6) (9.9)
Reported SSI income ($) 2.91 236 0.0
(0.5) (9.9) (0.0)
Total income, including SSI ($) 1,918 517 429
(41.0) (9.5) (19.6)
Has Social Security income (%) 0.95 0.72 0.83
(0.003) (0.023) (0.022)
Has labor earnings (%) 0.11 0.010 0.044
(0.004) (0.005) (0.012)
Asset variables
Net worth ($) 195,142 11,696 28,155
(5,620) (1,285) (2,896)
Net worth, excluding housing ($) 118,952 341 606a
(4,741) (70) (667)
Own home (0/1) (%) 0.74 0.32 0.50
(0.006) (0.02) (0.03)
Value of home (positive, $) 102,877 35,315 57,709
(2,457) (3,016) (4,226)
Demographic variables (for male in couples)
Born in the United States (%) 0.92 0.75 0.79
(0.004) (0.02) (0.02)
Age at immigration (if not native born) 24.3 43.3 36.6
0.83 (2.30) (3.26)
Age 77.44 78.88 78.67
0.08 (0.35) (0.44)
Schooling (years) 11.3 6.4 8.2
(0.05) (0.21) (0.25)
Nonwhite (%) 0.07 0.38 0.28
(0.004) (0.03) (0.03)
Poor health (head or spouse) (%) 0.14 0.36 0.22
(0.005) (0.05) (0.02)
Married (0/1) (%) 0.41 0.16 (0.22)
(0.007) (0.02) (0.03)
Widowed (female) (%) 0.39 0.57 0.51
(0.007) (0.03) (0.03)
Living arrangements
Lives alone or with spouse (%) 0.78 0.65 0.66
(0.006) (0.03) (0.03)
Lives with children (%) 0.16 0.26 0.28
(0.005) (0.02) (0.03)
Lives with others (%) 0.07 0.11 0.08
(0.004) (0.02) (0.02)
N b 5363 392 282
aNegative mean wealth is due to one outlier (see text).
bDiﬀers for some variables due to missing values. Participation status is missing for eleven eligible
households, which are excluded from the table.wealth is excluded. The average number of years of schooling (using the
levelo fs chooling of the male for couples) is 11.3, and 7 percent are non-
white.
While none of those eligible for SSI beneﬁts is well oﬀ, those who are
actually receiving beneﬁts are in substantially worse ﬁnancial straits than
those who are not. The participants have average monthly pre-SSI income
of $288, compared to $429 for those not receiving beneﬁts. This lower in-
come corresponds to a higher expected beneﬁt for the participants than for
the eligible nonparticipants, $223 compared to $156. This calculated bene-
ﬁt agrees well with the SSI income reported by recipients: The mean value
of SSI actually receivedi s$236, and the correlation between the calculated
and reported amounts is 0.74.19 When reported SSI beneﬁts are added to
the income of the participants, their incomes actually exceed those of the
eligible nonparticipants, with an average monthly income that is $88
greater. SSI thus makes a large diﬀerence in the economic well-being of
these individuals.
With respect to asset levels, those who are receiving beneﬁts have sub-
stantially lower net worth than eligible nonparticipants, $11,696 versus
$28,155, and a lower probability of home ownership. For both groups,
nonhousing wealth is nearly nonexistent. Mean wealth, excluding housing
wealth, is $341 for participants, while for nonparticipants it is actually
negative (the medians are both zero).20 These means stand in sharp con-
trast to mean (nonhousing) wealth reported earlier for those who are in-
come but not asset eligible; the mean for those household units is $103,756.
The Social Security program is typically viewed as providing nearly uni-
versal coverage, and in fact 95 percent of the ineligible sample are receiving
Social Security beneﬁts. However, many of the participants are not; only
72 percent of this subsample reported receiving Social Security in the pre-
vious month. One possible explanation for the lack of beneﬁts is the immi-
grant status of this population. Whereas 92 percent of the ineligible sample
were born in the United States, only 75 percent of the eligible participants
and 79 percent of the eligible nonparticipants were born here. There is also
a substantial diﬀerence across groups in the age at arrival for those who
did immigrate, increasing from twenty-four years old among the ineligibles
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19. The calculated amount is on average lower than the reported amount because individu-
als may receive higher than predicted state beneﬁts due to special needs. For example, in
California the guarantee for an individual needing “nonmedical out-of-home care” is $116
more per month than someone who does not. In Connecticut, individuals may receive addi-
tional beneﬁts to pay for such items as meals-on-wheels programs ($73.50 per month for one
meal a day). I account for these extra payments where the data permit me to do so (such as
an extra payment to those not having kitchen facilities in California), but in most cases I am
unable to assess these special needs and, using the state income guarantees for those living
independently, err consistently on the side of lower beneﬁts.
20. The negative mean value is the result of one observation with (nonhousing) debt of
$100,000. If this observation is eliminated, the mean for this subsample is $694.to forty-three years old among the eligible participants. This late arrival
suggests that many of those eligible for SSI may not have a suﬃcient earn-
ings history to qualify for Social Security beneﬁts and may have low bene-
ﬁtsi fthey do qualify.21
There is also a substantial diﬀerence across groups in marital status; 16
percent of the participants are married, compared to 22 percent of the
nonparticipants. The majority of those who are not married are widowed
women. Fifty-seven percent of the participants and 51 percent of the elig-
ible nonparticipants are widows.
Participants are more likely to be nonwhite, have approximately two
fewer years of schooling on average, and are much more likely to report be-
ing in poor health—36 versus 22 percent—than eligible nonparticipants.
Perhaps surprisingly, living arrangements for the two groups of eligibles
ares imilar, although participants are somewhat more likely to live with
others. Both groups are substantially less likely to live independently and
more likely to live with children than are those ineligible for beneﬁts.
2.2.4 Supplemental Security Income and Poverty
As discussed previously, the levels of the federal guarantees relative to
the appropriate poverty lines indicate that the eﬀecto fSSI on the poverty
rate itself is likely to be small, even if the program has a large eﬀect on the
well-being of the elderly poor. One common measure of the degree of pov-
erty is the “poverty gap,” which is deﬁned as the total dollar amount
needed to raise all incomes to the poverty line. As shown in table 2.3, if
SSI is excluded from income, the poverty rate for the entire sample is 17.2
percent,22 and the poverty gap, weighted to represent the total for the rele-
vant U.S. population, is $7.45 billion.23
Thes econd row of the table considers the eﬀects of the federal program
alone. If all those who are eligible for federal beneﬁts are assigned their
expected amount, the fraction with income below the poverty line falls
only slightly, but the poverty gap declines by 34 percent. Adding potential
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21. Diﬀerences in immigration status by group are not due to a correlation between diﬀer-
encesi nl evels of state supplemental beneﬁts and the regional distribution of immigrants.
The same pattern is evident if only federal eligibility is used.
22. The poverty rates presented here are somewhat higher than published poverty rates of
the elderly for two reasons. First, for those elderly living with individuals other than a spouse,
the income of these other individuals is not included in my measure of total income (nor is
their presence included in the determination of the appropriate poverty line). I do so in order
to measure well-being while abstracting from the decision to coreside. Obviously one of the
ways poverty among the elderly can be reduced is through an increase in the number coresid-
ing with children or others. It is not clear that the introduction of the dependent relationship
improves the well-being of the elderly person. The second reason for the high poverty rate is
that the sample is representative of those age seventy and over. Poverty increases sharply
with age after sixty-ﬁve.
23. I remind the reader that the AHEAD sample is representative of the noninstitutional
population age seventy and over and their spouses. In section 2.3.2, I discuss one method of
inﬂating these ﬁgures to represent the values for the population age sixty-ﬁve and over.state beneﬁts for all eligible units (third row) decreases the poverty rate to
15.9 percent, and the poverty gap falls even further, for a total decline of
40 percent. Even with the relatively low level of take-up among eligibles,
the reduction in the poverty gap is substantial. As shown in the ﬁnal row,
using current recipiency patterns (i.e., eligible nonparticipants receive zero
beneﬁts) and actual beneﬁts, the poverty rate is just 1 percentage point
lower than without SSI, but the poverty gap is nearly 30 percent smaller
than the no-SSI value. These ﬁgures provide a clear indication of both the
ability and potential of SSI to reach the poor elderly.24
Figure 2.1 illustrates graphically the change in the distribution of in-
come for the poor. The sample used in the ﬁgure is the population with
income below the poverty line in the absence of SSI. The horizontal axis
measures the ratio of income to the poverty line in 10 percent intervals
(0–10, 10–20,...9 0 – 100), and the vertical axis measures the fraction of
the sample in each interval. The dark bars depict the distribution if SSI is
excluded from income, while the light bars show the expected distribution
if all eligible units were to enroll in the program. The largest change comes
in the very bottom of the distribution. In the absence of SSI, 11.5 percent
of this poverty sample would have incomes equal to less than 10 percent
of the poverty line. For single individuals this interval corresponds to
monthly incomes of less than $58, indicating that they have virtually no
income other than SSI; for couples the interval corresponds to income less
than $73.25 With 100 percent participation, the fraction with incomes this
low decreases to just 1.3 percent.26 There is also a sharp change in the
fraction of the sample with incomes between 70 and 80 percent of the
24. It should be noted that if SSI beneﬁts are underreported, then the eﬀecto fthe current
program on poverty is understated.
25. One would expect that if SSI were not available, other behaviors would change. Some
individuals might save or work more prior to retirement, some might postpone retirement,
and some might receive greater transfers from family and friends. Others, however, would
have no alternative means of support.
26. All twelve family units who remain in this lowest decile are ineligible for SSI because
of the asset test.
Table 2.3 Poverty with and without Supplemental Security Income (SSI)
Poverty Gap
Poverty
Income Measure Rate (%) $ billions % Reduction
No SSI 17.2 7.45 —
All potential federal beneﬁts paid 17.0 4.91 34.1
All potential beneﬁts paid 15.9 4.43 40.5
Current recipiency patterns and beneﬁts 16.2 5.30 28.9
Notes: Thep overty gap is the total amount needed to increase all incomes to the poverty
line. Figures are weighted to represent national yearly totals for the AHEAD sample.
60 Kathleen McGarrypoverty line. Federal SSI guarantees are equal to 73 percent of the poverty
line for singles and 87 percent for couples. Because the majority of those
eligible for beneﬁts are single, the income of a substantial fraction of the
population is increased to the 70–80 percent interval (although not to ex-
actly 73 percent of the poverty line, because of the income disregards).
2.2.5 Correlates of Nonparticipation
Given the potential for improvement in their ﬁnancial status, one might
question the decision made by the eligible nonparticipants. Certainly the
beneﬁts to which the nonparticipating units are entitled are lower than
those of the participants ($156 versus $223 on average), but they are still
substantial, equal to 36 percent of average income. The choice is even more
puzzlingwhenoneconsiderstherelativestabilityoftheincomeoftheelderly
and the likelihood that eligibility will remain unchanged for many years.
Over a lifetime, the forgone beneﬁts could represent a large sum.
To understand better the choice of nonparticipation, and to assess how
participation rates would change in response to changes in beneﬁts, I esti-
mate a probit model for the probability of enrolling in SSI conditional on
eligibility. The underlying theoretical model assumes that eligible units will
enroll in SSI (Pi  1) if the gain from the program (Gi)i sg reater than the
associated costs (Ci). Thus,
P GC
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Fig. 2.1 Distribution of incomeGi depends in large part on the magnitude of the expected beneﬁt (Bi), but
may vary with characteristics of the individual such as health status. The
variables used to measure Gi and Ci follow directly from the explanations
for nonparticipation oﬀered previously in the literature as summarized in
section 2.1.2. The coeﬃcient estimates for the reduced form speciﬁcation
arer eported in table 2.4.
As was noted in the table of means, participation appears to be based
largely on need, and this result is borne out in the regressions. The magni-
tude of the expected beneﬁt, which is inversely related to pre-SSI income,
has a positive and signiﬁcant eﬀecto nthe likelihood of participating. An
increase of $100 in the beneﬁt increases the probability of enrolling in the
SSI program by 6.8 percentage points. Home ownership also has a large
eﬀecto np articipation, lowering the probability by 12.7 percentage points.
As demonstrated above, net worth consists primarily of the value of a
home. Its eﬀecti nthe regression is to reduce signiﬁcantly the probability
of enrolling. Being married is associated with a signiﬁcantly lower proba-
Table 2.4 Probit Estimates of the Probability of Participating in SSI Conditional
on Eligibility for Federal Beneﬁts
Coeﬃcient Derivative
Potential beneﬁt ($100) 0.146 0.068
(0.043)
Net worth ($10,000) 0.068 0.032
(0.022)
Own home (0/1) 0.271 0.127
(0.156)
Married (0/1) 0.435 0.203
(0.156)
Yearso fs chooling (male in couple) 0.047 0.022
(0.013)
Nonwhite (male in couple) 0.054 0.025
(0.106)
Poor health (either spouse) 0.251 0.117
(0.117)
Receives Social Security (0/1) 0.061 0.028
(0.190)
Earnings ($100) 0.081 0.038
(0.219)
Number of children 0.051 0.024
(0.018)
Urban resident (0/1) 0.283 0.132
(0.112)
N 674
Mean of dependent variable 0.582
Notes: Regression includes indicators for missing values of some variables and a constant
term. Observations with missing values of the dependent variable are excluded.
62 Kathleen McGarrybility of participation, a surprising result because, assuming that the ex-
pected beneﬁt and net worth are constant, married couples have fewer
resources per person and ought to be more in need of assistance.27
One of the explanations frequently oﬀered for nonparticipation in wel-
fare programs is that individuals do not know about the program (Da-
ponte, Sanders, and Taylor 1999). The results here contradict this hypothe-
sis. If there were informational barriers, one would expect those with more
schooling to be more knowledgeable, as might those living in a urban area.
Here both eﬀects are associated with signiﬁcant reductions in participa-
tion.28 Furthermore, a primary method for informing people about SSI is
through their receipt of Social Security. Those receiving Social Security
are therefore more likely toh ave been informed about the program, but
there is no eﬀect onp a r ticipation.
The eﬀecto fp oorh e alth is large and signiﬁcant.29 Thosei np oorh e alth
are1 2p ercentage points more likely to be enrolled. This large diﬀerence
may come about through the interaction of Medicaid and SSI. As dis-
cussed previously, SSI participants are categorically eligible for Medicaid
in most states, increasing the incentive for those with medical expenses to
enroll in SSI. The link between Medicaid and SSI may also make enroll-
ment more likely if those having received medical treatment for a prior
illnesswereencouragedtoenrollinSSIbythehealthcareprovider,ensuring
that the provider was reimbursed by the accompanying Medicaid beneﬁts.
Ther e sults in table 2.4 are consistent with those from earlier studies.
While the decision to forgo SSI beneﬁts remains a puzzle, there does seem
to be strong evidence that enrollment is related to need, as measured both
in terms of the magnitude of the expected beneﬁt and other factors that
proxy ﬁnancial well-being. There appears to be little evidence of a correla-
tion between proxies for informational barriers (schooling, Social Security
receipt), the physical diﬃculty of enrolling (health, urban residence) or
the intellectual diﬃculty (schooling). The observed relationships appear
most consistent with a model wherein some cost—perhaps stigma, as hy-
pothesized in Moﬃtt (1983)—discourages enrollment unless the marginal
utility of the beneﬁt is suﬃciently large. The results also indicate that mod-
iﬁcations to the SSI program that increase potential beneﬁts or decrease
the stigma associated with recipiency will increase the probability with
which eligible households enroll and therefore increase the number of par-
ticipants beyond that projected from a simple increase in eligibility.
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27. SSI beneﬁts and wealth are measured for the family unit. They are not scaled to be a
per-person measure.
28. Schooling probably also proxies diﬀerences in lifetime income not captured by the
income and asset variables.
29. Age was initially controlled for in the regression, but it had no eﬀect on participation
when income, assets, and health were included.2.3 Possible Changes in Supplemental Security Income
Ar e structuring of the Social Security system may induce corresponding
changes in the parameters of the SSI program. In this section I explore the
potential eﬀects of various changes in SSI guidelines on eligibility, costs,
and poverty. I look ﬁrst at the elimination of the asset test, then at the ef-
fects of increasing the income disregards and the income guarantees, and
ﬁnally at a simpliﬁcation of the determination of countable income. In all
casesIc onsider only changes to the federal program and assume that
states do not alter their beneﬁt schedules or eligibility criteria in response.
Ther e sults of these simulations are reported in tables 2.5–2.8.
It should be emphasized that any changes in the structure of Social
Security or SSI are likely to induce changes in other economic behaviors,
particularly savings, labor force participation, and the choice of living ar-
rangements. Although these changes could well be signiﬁcant, it is beyond
the scope of this chapter to model these broader eﬀects.
Because actual beneﬁts and participation are not observed with these
simulated changes, the comparisons presented here use the calculated ben-
eﬁts and probabilities of participation imputed from the estimated coeﬃ-
cients of the probit model. I estimate the total cost of each of the alterna-
tivesb yw eighting each eligible unit’s expected beneﬁt by its calculated
probability of participating and summing these weighted amounts.30 This
cost is an underestimate of the true cost of the aged portion of the SSI
program for several reasons. Most importantly, the sample in this paper
excludes eligible individuals aged sixty-ﬁve to sixty-nine unless they are
married to age-eligible persons, and also excludes those in nursing homes.
(The size of the population aged sixty-ﬁve to sixty-nine is approximately
48 percent of the size of that aged seventy and over, and approximately 4
percent of the elderly are in nursing homes.) Second, as noted in footnote
19, my estimate of the expected beneﬁt is biased downward because I can-
notc alculate the value of payments made for special needs. Finally, there
are somei nthe sample whom I determine to be ineligible for beneﬁts who
are actually receiving payments from the SSI program. These amounts are
not included in the calculations based on predicted beneﬁts and participa-
tion.F or similar reasons, the number of eligible and participating family
units is notr epresentative of all those who would be eligible in the U.S.
population. Because of these limitations, I ﬁrst report changes in eligibility,
participation, and costs in percentage terms (table 2.5) and then adjust
the baseline estimates for these biases and present estimated costs and
participation levels for the population sixty-ﬁve and over (table 2.6).
30. This ﬁgure is calculated as i(Pi  Beneﬁti)w here Pi is the probability an eligible unit














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.2.3.1 The Eﬀects on Eligibility and Participation
The ﬁrst row of table 2.5 reports beneﬁts and participation under the
current system. For the eligible population, the empirical model predicts
ap articipation rate of 56.7 percent, nearly identical to the observed
(weighted) rate of 55.9 percent.31 Thea verage calculated beneﬁt for all 685
eligible units is $195 (the average of $223 and $156 in table 2.2).
Eliminating the Asset Test
In redesigning eligibility guidelines, one change that might be consid-
ered is an elimination of the asset test. It is often argued that such tests
discourage savings, whereas an important goal of retirement policy is likely
to be the encouragement of individual savings as a means of old age sup-
port. Furthermore, the asset test represents an additional administrative
burden and, given the strict income limits and low participation rate, may
not actually result in large changes in the participating population. By
using the AHEAD data, one can simulate the eﬀecto fthis change on
program participation and costs. It is a relatively straightforward exercise
to calculate the increase in eligibility—the number of families whose
31. The mean of the dependent variable in table 2.4 diﬀers from 55.9 because it is not
weighted by sampling probabilities.
Table 2.6 Impact of Alternative Eligibility Guidelines for SSI: Estimates of Total Cost
and Participation
AHEAD Age 70 AHEAD Age 65 SSA Age 65
(1)a (2) (3)
Total No. of Total No. of Total No. of
Plan Costs Units Costs Units Costs Units
Current program 2.78 1.04 4.28 1.60 6.07 2.07
No asset test 3.11 1.19 4.79 1.83 6.78 2.36
Unearned disregard equals $75 3.18 1.19 4.90 1.83 6.95 2.37
Guarantee raised to poverty line,
with asset test 4.51 1.44 6.95 2.21 9.86 2.86
Guarantee raised to poverty line,
no asset test 5.34 1.79 8.22 2.76 11.66 3.57
Social Security–based eligibility 2.92 1.10 4.49 1.70 6.37 2.20
Sources: Author’s tabulations based on AHEAD and SSA data.
Notes: Costs are in billions of 1993 dollars, participation in millions of units. In column 1, estimates
from reported SSI beneﬁts in AHEAD correspond to the noninstitutional population born in 1923 or
earlier (and their spouses). In column 2, estimates from column 1 are multiplied by 1.54 to include costs
for those aged 65–69 and for those in nursing homes. In column 3, costs are based on published ﬁgures
for total SSI beneﬁts paid to the elderly in 1993. Number of SSI units is determined by dividing yearly
costs by average beneﬁts. SSA ﬁgures are multiplied by 1.43 to include beneﬁts paid to those elderly
originally classiﬁed as disabled or blind, and remaining so.
66 Kathleen McGarrycountable income is below the guarantees but who have assets above the
limit.32 However, one also needs to determine what fraction of the newly
eligible would choose to enroll in the program. I do so using the estimated
effectsfromtable2.4andtheobservablecharacteristicsofeachfamilyunit.
With the elimination of the asset test, those eligible for SSI under the
current program experience no change in eligibility or beneﬁts and there-
fore no change in participation. The total number of eligible family units,
however, increases by 32.5 percent. Because income and asset holding are
positively correlated, the newly eligible have higher incomes and therefore
lower expected beneﬁts than those eligible initially, $177 compared to
$195. Given the positive relationship between beneﬁts are participation,
and the negative relationship between net worth and enrollment, the newly
eligible also have a substantially lower probability of enrolling in SSI than
do those eligible under current rules. The probability of participating in
SSI for the newly eligible is just 24.6 percent, compared to 56.7 for the
initial sample. Based on the weighted sum of probabilities (iPi), the ex-
pected increase in the participating population is 14.1 percent.
Using the expected beneﬁts and the estimated probability of participa-
tion fore ach newly eligible unit to predict the additional cost associated
with the expansion, I ﬁnd that payments (exclusive of administrative ex-
penses) increase by 11.7 percent.33
Increasing Unearned Income Disregard
Thef e deral income guarantees are indexed for inﬂation and have in-
creased every year since the program’s inception. The asset limits have also
grown over time. However, the income disregards haven ever been in-
creased and remain at their initial levels—the ﬁrst $65 of earned income
and half of the remainder, and the ﬁrst $20 of unearned income. One
change in SSI that has been mentioned among policy makers is an increase
in the disregard for unearned income from $20 to $75 per month.34
In the case of eliminating the asset test, the eﬀects are felt only among
the newly eligible. Here, however, there is both an increase in beneﬁts
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32. Here I consider eliminating the asset test for the federal program only. I assume that
states maintain their current restrictions. The change in eligibility predicted here thus diﬀers
from that in table 2.1, where the asset test is eliminated at both levels.
33. These calculations (and those that follow) assume that the decision-making process
does not change with the program expansions (i.e., that the estimated eﬀects in table 2.4
remain valid). If the elimination of the asset test alters the desirability of enrollment, there
will be changes in participation beyond those forecast here. For example, individuals may
falsely believe that they are ineligible for SSI because they own a home. Eliminating the asset
test might well reduce the prevalence of this misconception, changing the eﬀect ofh o m e
ownership on the participation decision. Similarly, some may view the asset test as an un-
pleasant requirement and refuse to apply for beneﬁts if they need to provide such informa-
tion. Again in this case, elimination of the asset test would increase enrollment beyond those
whoa re newly eligible.
34. I thank Robert Schoeni for bringing this discussion to my attention.among those previously eligible and an increase in the number eligible.
Overall, the average beneﬁt for the initially eligible subsample increases
from $195 to $221: Those who were already participating initially see their
average beneﬁts increase from $223 to $249, and those who were eligible
butn ot participating see an increase in their average beneﬁts from $156
to $183 (breakdown by subgroup not shown). This increase in potential
beneﬁts will induce some of the eligible nonparticipants to enroll in SSI,
and the average probability of participating for the entire eligible popula-
tion increases slightly, from 56.7 to 58.0 percent. The increase in beneﬁts
and participation leads to an increase of 13 percent in costs for this
group alone.
In addition to these changes, there is an increase of 14.2 percent in the
number of eligible units. However, the expected beneﬁt for the group of
newly eligibles is small, averaging just $29 per month. Because of this low
beneﬁt, their average probability of participating is 49.1 percent, and the
cost arising from the increase in eligibility is equal to just 1.6 percent of
initial spending. Combining the additional costs for each group, the total
increase in costs for this expansion is 14.5 percent over the initial amount.
Raising Guarantees to the Poverty Line
Several states oﬀer supplements to SSI that eﬀectively raise the incomes
of the participating population to slightly above the poverty line. In con-
sidering plans to reduce or eliminate poverty among the elderly, one ob-
vious solution is to raise the federal income guarantee to this level. This
proposal has been discussed several times in the past (Zedlewski and
Meyer 1989) and continues to be mentioned by policy makers. For those
whol ive in states with guarantees above the poverty lines, the increase in
federal beneﬁts results in no change in their incomes: A greater fraction
of their beneﬁt will be paid for by the federal government, and a smaller
fraction by the state, but there will be no increase in the total received. In
contrast, those in less generous states could see a sizable increase in their
monthly beneﬁts, and some of those initially eligible but not enrolling at
current levels may now ﬁnd participation to be a more appealing option.
At the same time, increasing the federal guarantees will also make more
individuals eligible for the program and will increase participation along
that avenue.
Increasing the federal guarantees to the poverty line—$577.50 per
month for a single individual and $728.33 for a couple in 199335—with no
change in state programs results in a sharp increase in the average beneﬁts
for those who were initially eligible, from $195 to $288, and the probability
of participating in SSI increases to 61 percent. The cost of this change is
great, equal to 52 percent of initial expenditures.
35. $592.33 and $747.25 in 1994.
68 Kathleen McGarryIncreasing beneﬁts also has a large eﬀect on the number of eligible units,
increasing the eligible population by 36 percent. However, as was the case
when increasing the disregard, the expected beneﬁt for the newly eligible
is small, equal to $71, and their predicted participation rate is 47.3 per-
cent. Given the relatively low beneﬁts to which they are entitled, the ex-
pected additional outlay of SSI beneﬁts for this group of newly eligible is
just 10 percent of initial spending. The total increase in costs for this ex-
pansionisthereforeequalto62percentofinitialexpenditures,withthevast
majority of the increase accruing to those who were initially eligible.
This simulation assumed that the asset test remained in eﬀect. The ﬁfth
row of table 2.5 reports the results of the same increase in income guaran-
tees accompanied by an elimination of the asset test. This combination
ensures that virtually all elderly will have the opportunity to increase their
incomes above the poverty line.36
Thosew ho were initially eligible for SSI are unaﬀected by the additional
elimination of the asset test, and the increases in beneﬁts and costs for this
group are the same as in the previous example (fourth row). However,
eliminating the asset test dramatically increases the eligible population,
more than doubling its size. Following this change in eligibility, the partici-
pating population increases by 72 percent, 34 percentage points above the
increase with no change in the asset test. Corresponding to the large in-
creases in beneﬁts and participation, there is a sharp increase in costs. In
this expansion, expected payments increase by 92 percent.37
Using Social Security Income
The ﬁnal alternative I investigate is basing eligibility and beneﬁts on
Social Security income alone, eliminating income disregards and confer-
ring eligibility on those with Social Security income, rather than countable
income, below the guarantee levels. This procedure would likely reduce
administrative eﬀortf or both the SSA and the applicants, because Social
Security beneﬁts are readily observable by SSA and need not be reported
or veriﬁed.38 Thed rawback is that individuals with low Social Security
beneﬁts but with substantial other income could qualify for SSI, although
with the asset test in place this group would be expected to be small.
36. It is possible that those who live with others and have the guarantees reduced accord-
ingly could remain poor.
37. These ﬁgures reﬂect the percentage increases in the combined payments of the federal
and state programs. Because the simulations assume that state programs are unchanged, in
many cases the increase in the federal beneﬁts will simply replace state spending. The per-
centage increase in federal costs is therefore larger than the overall increase. When guarantees
arer aised to the poverty line and the asset test remains in place, my calculations predict an
increase in federal spending of 95 percent. If the asset test is eliminated, federal spending
increases by 133 percent.
38. Administrative expenses for the SSI program are actually larger than for the OASDI
program (SSA 2000). However, many of these costs are likely due to the disabled portion of
the SSI program, not from the beneﬁts going to the eligible elderly.
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Security chosen as the cutoﬀ for eligibility. In the AHEAD sample, the
maximum Social Security beneﬁts received by singles and couples eligible
for federal SSI beneﬁts under current rules are $441 and $644.39 Because
many family units are likely to have some income from sources other than
Social Security, a reasonable choice of income limits might be the 90th
percentiles—$418 for singles and $620 for couples.40 Using these amounts
as income guarantees, with no income disregards, results in a net increase
in the eligible population of 9.6 percent, with a small number of those
initially eligible for beneﬁts becoming ineligible due to the elimination of
income disregards and the slightly lower guarantee level.41 Expected par-
ticipation increases by the somewhat smaller amount of 6.2 percent. The
total cost of this method is similar to the current program, with an increase
in expenditures of 5 percent.
As noted earlier, these simulations are based on the assumption that the
participation decision does not change when beneﬁt formulas change. In
this case in particular, the assumption may not be valid. One might imag-
ine that if beneﬁts were tied directly to low Social Security rather than to
generally low income, the program might be viewed less as a welfare pro-
gram and more as a supplement to Social Security itself, and participation
rates could increase across the board.42
2.3.2 Costs of Changes
The increases in expected payments and the increases in the number of
participating family units associated with each of these changes have thus
far been expressed as percentage increases relative to the current program.
Of particular relevance to policy makers and researchers is the cost of
the SSI program for the entire elderly population. As noted above, the
AHEAD sample does not provide such an estimate. By making some as-
sumptions, however, it is possible to inﬂate the baseline amounts calculated
from the AHEAD data to approximate the values for the population aged
sixty-ﬁve and over. I make these adjustments in the ﬁrst row of table 2.6
and then apply the estimated percentage increases for each hypothesized
change (from table 2.5) to estimate the eﬀects of the program expansions.
In the ﬁrst row of table 2.6Ip r esent the costs and the number of partici-
pating units for the current program using three diﬀerent measures. In the
39. Because some states (notably California) have guarantees that are signiﬁcantly higher
than the federal levels, the maximum Social Security beneﬁts among all eligibles (state and
federal) are much higher at $897 and $1,180.
40. In this simulation, guarantees for 1994 are set by increasing the 1993 amounts to ac-
count for inﬂation.
41. Of the initially eligible, 91 percent remain eligible under the new rules.
42. The role of stigma, and indeed nonparticipation itself, could be eliminated in its en-
tirety if the level of Social Security income were the only earnings test, the asset test were
eliminated, and no application for SSI was required.
70 Kathleen McGarryﬁrst set of columns I use the population weighted sums of observed bene-
ﬁtsa nd participants for the AHEAD sample, $2.78 billion and 1.04 million
participating units.43 These ﬁgures are the totals relevant for the noninsti-
tutional population aged seventy and over and their spouses. The numbers
do not include the population aged sixty-ﬁve to sixty-nine, which is ap-
proximately 48 percent as large as that aged seventy and over, nor do they
include the approximately 4 percent of elderly who live in nursing homes.44
In column (2) I incorporate these omitted segments of the elderly popula-
tion by simply multiplying the numbers in the ﬁrst set of columns by 1.54
(1.48  1.04). This procedure yields a total cost of $4.28 billion in 1993
dollars and a total enrolled population of 1.6 million family units.45 As an
alternative estimate (column [3]), I use published ﬁgures from the SSA for
SSI beneﬁts to aged individuals in 1993 (SSA 1999). Using administrative
data will correct for the possible underreporting of beneﬁt receipt in
AHEAD. The administrative values for 1993, $4.25 billion and $1.46 mil-
lion, compare well with the inﬂated AHEAD numbers (not shown). How-
ever, these ﬁgures for aged recipients do not include those aged sixty-ﬁve
ando verw ho arer eceiving SSI but who initially enrolled in the program
as a disabled or blind recipient. To approximate the totals for the entire
population aged sixty-ﬁve and over, I multiply the $4.25 billion in beneﬁts
and the 1.46 million participating units by 1.43 to yield total estimated
costs of $6.07 billion and a participating population of 2.07 million.46 The
diﬀerence in the size of the enrolled population between columns two and
three suggests that, indeed, there might be a large amount of underre-
porting of SSI receipt in survey data.
The subsequent rows in the table provide cost and participant projec-
tionsf or each of the changes discussed in the previous section. As is evi-
dent from the percentage increases reported earlier, neither the elimination
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43. Using reported beneﬁts and recipiency corrects for any biases in my estimates based
on calculated beneﬁts and predicted probabilities.
44. If SSI beneﬁts are underreported, then this ﬁgure is a downward biased estimate of
the true cost of the program. Similarly, calculations of the increase in enrollment and costs
are also likely to be incorrect.
45. Inﬂating the AHEAD numbers by 48 percent “overcorrects” for the omitted popula-
tion, because spouses of age-eligible respondents who are sixty-ﬁve to sixty-nine are already
included in the sample. The estimates for those sixty-ﬁve and over are further biased upward
if one assumes that the younger elderly are better oﬀ than older cohorts due to diﬀerences
in lifetime wealth and the predictions of the lifecycle hypothesis, and therefore less likely to
be in need of SSI or to be receiving beneﬁts.
46. Published statistics from the SSA report 616,799 disabled aged sixty-ﬁve and over and
21,588 blind receiving federally administered SSI beneﬁts in 1993 (similar ﬁgures are not
available for those receiving only state-administered beneﬁts, approximately 7 percent of
total recipients). These numbers total 43 percent of those categorized as aged recipients and
receiving federally administered beneﬁts. Also, although beneﬁts are reported as the average
amount per family unit, the number of recipients in published SSA tables refers to the num-
ber of individuals, not the number of units. In table 2.6 I calculate the number of SSI units
by dividing total beneﬁts (measured yearly) by average monthly beneﬁts received (multiplied
by twelve).of the asset test nor the increase in the income disregard result in a sub-
stantial increase in costs or in the number enrolled. The 12–15 percent
increases in costs shown in table 2.5 correspond to $500 to $700 million
dollars when inﬂated to represent the population aged sixty-ﬁve and over,
while the increases in the participating population are approximately
200,000 to 300,000 units (second and third rows of table 2.6).
Thed r amatic 92 percent cost increase associated with the poverty line
guarantee and no asset test increases costs by approximately $4 to $5.5
billion and increases the number of enrolled families by 1 to 1.5 million.
Even with this large expansion and the most expensive set of statistics, the
total cost of the program remains below $12 billion.47 This cost is best
interpreted relative to other government programs: In 1993, total pay-
ments to the disabled segment of the SSI population were nearly $20 bil-
lion, payments to families in the AFDC were nearly $23 billion, and pay-
ments to food stamp beneﬁciaries were $22 billion.48
2.3.3 The Eﬀects on Poverty
How much do these expansions actually beneﬁt the elderly poor? Table
2.3 reported the potential for the current SSI program to reduce the pov-
erty rate and the poverty gap. While the reduction in the poverty rate due
to SSI was small, the reduction in the poverty gap was large, equal to a 30
percent decrease with current recipiency patterns. Table 2.7 shows the
eﬀects of the hypothesized changes to the SSI program on these measures.
Using calculated beneﬁts and predicted participation for the current pro-
gram, the poverty rate is 16.4 percent and the poverty gap is $5.34 billion.49
Neither eliminating the asset test nor raising the disregard has a measur-
able eﬀecto nthe poverty rate, and the reductions in the poverty gap asso-
ciated with these changes are approximately 5 to 6 percent.
Of all the changes to SSI that have been discussed here, only the changes
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47. The $4.25 billion in costs to aged recipients reported by the SSA represents federal
costs of $3.10 billion and state costs of $1.15 billion. Assigning the same federal/state division
to the inﬂated $6.07 billion in table 2.6 yields a division of expenditures of $4.43 for the
federal government and $1.64 billion for the states. Applying the 95 and 133 percentage
increases in federal spending (see note 37) to the $4.43 billion in federal expenditures under
the current programs raises total federal costs to $8.6 billion and $10.3 billion under the two
poverty line expansions.
48. It should be noted, however, that the increases in costs described here are limited to
the direct cost of beneﬁts from the SSI program. Because SSI recipients are likely to be
categorically eligible for both food stamps and Medicaid, the true increase in costs may be
much larger. Also, note that this simulation continues to assume less than full participation
among the eligible population.
49. For comparison with the simulations, this calculation uses the calculated beneﬁts
(rather than reported) and predicted participation probabilities. The values reported in table
2.6 therefore diﬀer slightly from those calculated on the basis of observed beneﬁts and partic-
ipation shown in the ﬁnal row of table 2.3 ($5.3 billion). Note also that these numbers are
not inﬂated to account for the age restrictions on the AHEAD sample. The reader can scale
these numbers by 1.54 if such an estimate is desired.that raise beneﬁts to the poverty line have a noticeable eﬀect on the pov-
erty rate, but the eﬀects are large, even given the low participation rates.
If federal guarantees are raised to the poverty line, the poverty rate (fourth
row) falls from 16.4 to 12.4 percent. With a concurrent elimination of the
asset test, poverty falls by an additional 1.4 percentage points, for a total
decline of 33 percent. There is also large decline in the poverty gap in these
two cases. When the asset test is left in place, the poverty gap falls by 25
percent, and with the additional elimination of the asset test it falls by
37 percent.
As shown in the ﬁnal row, there is no change in the poverty rate with
eligibility based on Social Security, but the poverty gap actually increases.
This increase occurs because some SSI beneﬁts in this regime accrue to
those with incomes above the poverty line and therefore have no eﬀect on
the poverty gap, while some individuals with incomes below the poverty
line lose their beneﬁts. It is important to note that these declines are mea-
sured relative to the current program, which in and of itself provides a 30
percent reduction relative to situation without SSI. (As shown in table
2.3, the poverty rate with no SSI is 17.2 percent, and the poverty gap is
$7.45 billion.)
2.3.4 Characteristics of the Newly Eligible
Thep r eceding tables report the changes in participation, costs, and
poverty associated with various changes in the parameters of the SSI pro-
gram. Each of these changes will beneﬁt a somewhat diﬀerent subset of
individuals. Table 2.8 presents the means of the regression variables for
the newly eligible units under each of these scenarios. For comparison, the
means of those initially eligible are reported in the ﬁrst column.
By deﬁnition, those who become eligible when the asset test is elimi-
Table 2.7 Impact of Alternative Eligibility Guidelines for SSI on the Poverty Gap
Poverty Gap
Poverty Rate $ billions % Reduction
Current program 16.4 5.34 —
No asset test 16.4 5.09 4.7
Increase unearned disregard to $75 16.4 5.03 5.8
Guarantee raised to poverty line,
asset test remains 12.4 4.02 24.7
Guarantee raised to poverty line,
no asset test 11.0 3.37 36.9
Social Security–based eligibility
guarantee equal 90% of
maximum SS 16.3 5.45 2.1
Note: All calculations use calculated beneﬁts and predicted participation rates.
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eligible. In this case, the mean value of wealth (including housing wealth)
for the newly eligible is $185,278, nearly ten times that of the initial sample.
This high wealth level is responsible for the low predicted probability of
participating in SSI (24.6 percent) seen in table 2.5. The newly eligible are
also twice as likely to own a home and to be married, and have over three
more years of schooling on average.
In contrast, when the unearned income disregard is raised (scenario 2),
those who become eligible must still meet the asset test, and mean assets
aren ot changed noticeably. In fact, the population of newly eligibles is
quites imilar to those initially eligible. The largest diﬀerences are in the
probability of receiving Social Security and of reporting positive earnings.
Because nearly all those without Social Security are likely to be eligible
for SSI beneﬁts with the initial (lower) disregard, and because increases in
the unearned income disregard act to increase the amount of Social Secu-
rity that is excluded from countable income, virtually all of the newly eligi-
ble, 99 percent, arer eceiving Social Security.
Raising the beneﬁt guarantees to the poverty line will again have little
eﬀecto nasset levels, but will allow those with greater incomes to qualify
for beneﬁts. Thus, as shown in the column for scenario 3, while the newly
eligible population is again nearly certain to have Social Security beneﬁts




Eligible (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Potential beneﬁt 195 177 21 71 144 140
Net worth 19,028 185,278 16,346 24,043 100,010 31,342
Own home (0/1) 0.40 0.82 0.42 0.55 0.68 0.61
Married (0/1) 0.19 0.43 0.13 0.11 0.22 0.26
Yearso fs chooling (male in
couple) 7.17 10.43 7.23 8.03 9.43 9.42
Nonwhite (male in couple) 0.33 0.14 0.25 0.27 0.16 0.23
Poor health (either spouse) 0.30 0.17 0.29 0.28 0.20 0.17
Receives Social Security
(0/1) 0.80 0.90 0.99 0.99 0.96 0.90
Number with earnings 0.02 0.04 0.09 0.07 0.05 0.15
Earnings (if positive) 179 62 30 188 222 597
Number of children) 3.3 2.6 2.8 3.0 2.6 3.0
Urban resident (0/1) 0.70 0.61 0.66 0.67 0.66 0.67
N 685 178 96 246 607 125
Notes: Scenario (1) corresponds to the elimination of the asset test. Scenario (2) corresponds to raising
the disregard for unearned income to $75. Scenario (3) corresponds to raising guarantees to the poverty
line with an asset test. Scenario (4) corresponds to raising guarantees to the poverty line with no asset
test. Scenario (5) corresponds to using only SS income to determine eligibility.
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those for the initially eligible subsample.
Eliminating the asset test along with the increase in the beneﬁt guaran-
tees again results in a newly eligible population with substantial net worth.
Them eanv alue of assets for this group is $100,010. The newly eligible
have more schooling, are substantially more likely to own a home, and are
less likely to be nonwhite or in poor health. They are also more likely to
have Social Security income and income from earnings.
Finally, if Social Security income alone is used in determining eligibility,
many of those with substantial labor earnings will be entitled to beneﬁts.
Because individuals can have unlimited labor earnings and still qualify for
beneﬁts, there is also a very large diﬀerence in the fraction with earnings,
2v ersus 15 percent, and in mean earnings (over positive values), which
increase from $179 to $597 per month.
2.4 Relationship Between Supplemental Security Income
and Social Security
As plans to reform Social Security are discussed and their eﬀects on the
well-being of the population analyzed, it is important to keep in mind
the potential interactions with SSI. One feature of the SSI program with
important consequences for the role of Social Security in aﬀecting the wel-
fare of the elderly poor is the implicit tax on beneﬁts. Because the beneﬁt
from SSI is equal to the diﬀerence between the income guarantee and
countable income, any increase in unearned income (above the $20 disre-
gard) reduces the SSI beneﬁt dollar-for-dollar. Thus, for SSI participants,
an additional dollar of Social Security income serves only to reduce the
SSI beneﬁt by one dollar, with no change in the total income of the recipi-
ent. Social Security payroll taxes paid by those eventually collecting SSI
are therefore in some sense “wasted” because they realize no real beneﬁts
from the Social Security program itself.
One implication of this 100 percent tax is that those who expect to re-
ceive SSI should begin collecting Social Security at the earliest age of eligi-
bility. There is no advantage to postponing retirement from age sixty-two
to ages ixty-ﬁve (or greater), since the higher beneﬁt associated with later
retirement does not result in an increase in income. With such a postpone-
ment, the individual simply loses the stream of beneﬁts from age sixty-two
to age sixty-ﬁve with no oﬀsetting increase in income after age sixty-ﬁve.
Because of this eﬀect, changes in the normal retirement age for Social
Security that leave unchanged the age for early retirement will have no
eﬀecto nthe decision by future SSI recipients of when to collect beneﬁts.
Furthermore, changes in Social Security beneﬁt levels with no changes in
the structure of SSI will have no eﬀecto nthe incomes of the majority of
SSI recipients.
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of individual retirement accounts. (See Feldstein and Samwick 1998 for a
discussion of such a plan, and Feldstein and Liebman, this volume, for
estimates of its distributional eﬀects.) Such a system would replace Social
Security payroll taxes, at least in part, with contributions invested in pri-
vate-sector ﬁnancial instruments to be used to ﬁnance a worker’s retire-
ment. There are several avenues along which SSI would aﬀect the opera-
tion and the redistributional aspects of such a system, depending on the
requirements to annuitize account balances, the type of annuities avail-
able, and the provisions for leaving bequests.
First, as in the current system, those who expect to have balances low
enough to qualify for SSI, regardless of the annuity type chosen, have little
incentive to save because their total income will be determined exclusively
by the SSI guarantees. Since savings rates are likely to be mandatory, this
eﬀect will show up as a work disincentive, similar to that in the current
program. Along the same lines, if investments in individual retirement ac-
counts are self-directed, those who expect to be eligible for SSI have an
incentive to take inordinate risks with their portfolios because they will be
unlikely to realize any beneﬁt from savings with moderate returns and will
be unaﬀected byl o s ses.
There is also the question of the treatment of account balances. If indi-
viduals were permitted to retain the balance in an account after age sixty-
ﬁve,i nlieu of immediate mandatory annuitization, some provision for
these balances would be necessary in the SSI asset test. One would not
wish to disqualify from SSI all those with more than $2,000 in such an
account, since such sums are small relative to the stream of Social Security
beneﬁts permitted under the current system. The accounting of these bal-
ances would be especially important for the disabled, who may qualify for
beneﬁts from SSI long before age sixty-ﬁve, but might be disqualiﬁed if
balances in retirement accounts were included in countable assets.
A system of mandatory annuitization would raise diﬀerent concerns,
with implications for the choice of annuity types and death beneﬁts. Brown
(chapter 10 in this volume) shows that under a single life annuity with no
bequests there is a sizable redistribution of wealth from those with short
life expectancies (the poor) to those with long life expectancies (the rich).
Them a gnitude of this redistribution is lessened if annuities have survivor-
ship beneﬁts. For those who will be eligible for SSI, the 100 percent tax on
SSI beneﬁts associated with an increase in annuity income means that
diﬀerences between joint and single life annuities will be unimportant in
most cases. If both the couple and the surviving spouse will be eligible for
SSI, then changes in the magnitude of the annuity payment, arising from
changes in the survivorship option, will alter the fractions of income com-
ing from SSI and Social Security annuities, but will have no eﬀect on total
income. Regardless of the annuity policy, total income will be equal to the
SSI guarantee.
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Period-certain annuities guarantee payment for a certain number of years
even if the annuitant dies before the end of that time. If the annuitant does
die before all guaranteed payments are paid, the remaining beneﬁts are
paid to his heirs. To ﬁnance this potential payout, payments during life
from these period-certain annuities are reduced relative to what they
would be with a straight life annuity. Brown shows that these period-
certain annuities reduce the redistribution of resources from short-lived to
long-lived individuals because they eﬀectively increase the number of years
of beneﬁts for those with high mortality rates. Including SSI in such a
calculation reinforces this eﬀect. If the annuitant is eligible for SSI, the
reduction in annuity payments needed to ﬁnance the period certain option
will not reduce his income. Additionally, should he die before the end of
the period, he will leave wealth to heirs at no cost to himself.
In addition to the choice of single or joint life, and straight life or period-
certain annuities, individuals may be able to choose an annuity with a
bequesto ption. This type of annuity would have the same eﬀect on the
redistribution of resources as a period-certain annuity. If given the option,
an annuitant eligible for SSI who cares at least somewhat about his heirs
will accept a reduction in the current ﬂow of payments in order to guaran-
tee a bequest, because he will not experience a corresponding reduction in
actual income, with SSI payments making up the diﬀerence.
As this discussion illustrates, the distributional eﬀects of alternative So-
cial Security reforms can depend heavily on the interactions with SSI, and
the details of any reform proposals need to consider the potential spill-
over eﬀects.
2.5 Discussion and Conclusions
Thep roposed privatization of Social Security raises a host of concerns
over the best way to implement such a change. Chief among these concerns
is how to provide for those elderly who reach old age with insuﬃcient
resources. When considering the needs of the elderly poor and possible
methods to alleviate their poverty, it is instructive to examine the features
of the existing SSI program and its success in improving the well-being of
itst arget population. This chapter has addressed these issues.
In its current state, the SSI program has done much to improve the lot
of the poorest elderly. While not eliminating poverty among the elderly, it
has succeeded in raising the incomes of many of the poorest by a substan-
tial amount. Under the current system, the poverty gap for the elderly (the
amount of money needed to increase the incomes of all poor individuals
to the poverty line) is 30 percent lower than it would be in the absence of
SSI. Furthermore, for those enrolled in the program, SSI provides, on aver-
age, 42 percent of total monthly income. However, the potential for SSI to
assist the elderly poor is even greater. Only 56 percent of those who appear
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ipation rate of the current program were increased to 100 percent, the
poverty gap could be reduced by an additional 11 percentage points.
This chapter explores the eﬀects of several possible changes to the cur-
rent SSI program. In simulating the changes in participation and costs, I
control for the probability that eligible individuals may not enroll in the
program. These simulations indicate that guaranteeing all elderly an in-
come equal to the poverty line is potentially costly, increasing the current
beneﬁt outlays to the elderly by 62 percent with an asset test in eﬀect, and
by over 90 percent with the concurrent elimination of the asset test. Based
on 1993 ﬁgures, this change results in an additional expenditure of approx-
imately 5.5 billion dollars for the entire age-eligible population. However,
because SSI payments to the elderly are dwarfed by those to the disabled,
these changes are equal to increases of just 22 percent relative to the total
payments in the SSI program. Other changes examined here have smaller
cost increases, and correspondingly smaller improvements in the well-
being of the elderly poor. Furthermore, because participation rates typi-
cally hover around 60 percent, the greatest costs and the greatest improve-
ments in ﬁnancial well-being will come from programs that also encourage
higher rates of participation.
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Comment Bruce D. Meyer
This chapter provides an excellent background on the Supplemental Secu-
rity Income (SSI) program. It also provides a nice description of who re-
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Guaranteed Income: SSI and the Well-Being of Elderly Poor 79ceives SSI and how the beneﬁts aﬀect their income and poverty rates. The
simulations of possible program expansions are well chosen and extremely
useful. I will ﬁrst summarize some of the key facts and ﬁndings in the
chapter, then oﬀer some caveats and discuss how the underreporting of
SSI aﬀects the results in the chapter. I will then oﬀer some possible exten-
sionst othe analyses in the chapter.
There are a few main facts that are important to know about SSI. First,
spending on the SSI aged is small, about $4.4 billion in 1997. Second, the
typical maximum beneﬁt is not especially high. The maximum monthly
federal beneﬁt, called the guarantee amount, was $484 for a single individ-
ual and $726 for a couple in 1997. There are state supplements to these
beneﬁts in many states. Third, average monthly beneﬁts are much lower
than the maximum beneﬁt, due to deductions for other income and earn-
ings. The average federal monthly payment was $235, while the average
state monthly payment was $114.
The chapter features several key ﬁndings. First, there is substantial SSI
nonparticipation. Only 56 percent of eligibles participate, though I believe
this number is a sharp underestimate, for reasons I give below. The charac-
teristics of eligible nonparticipants are mostly sensible. They tend to be
eligible for lower beneﬁts and to be healthier. They also are more educated
and more likely to receive social security. This last result does not accord
with the idea that those who are more likely to be informed are more likely
to participate. Second, SSI substantially reduces poverty. SSI reduces the
poverty rate among the elderly from 17.2 percent to 16.2 percent in the
sample in the paper. More importantly, it creates a 29 percent reduction
in the poverty gap (the amount of money needed to raise everyone to the
poverty line), a much better measure of the eﬀect on the poor. Third, SSI
expansions would reduce poverty further at a fairly low cost. Raising the
maximum beneﬁt, the guarantee, to the poverty line along with eliminating
asset limits for beneﬁt receipt is the most extensive expansion considered.
In 1993 this change would have raised the guarantee for a single individual
from $422 per month to $577, and for a couple from $633 to $728. This
reform would reduce the poverty rate another 5.4 percentage points and
the poverty gap by just under 37 percent, at a cost of $5.6 billion.
Many of my earlier comments are reﬂected in McGarry’s revisions to
this chapter. However, there remain severalk ey issues that haven ot been
completely addressed. First, when extrapolating the results from the Asset
and Health Dynamics (AHEAD) study sample to the aged SSI population
in general, it would be useful to know how well the sample represents
the aged SSI eligible population. The degree of conﬁdence we have in the
estimates would be greater if there were more discussion of this issue in
the chapter. There are several reasons to be concerned that the sample is
notv ery representative: There are indications of problems with the sample
weights, and the sample frame seems to exclude most of the younger aged,
those sixty-ﬁve to seventy, and persons in nursing homes.
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the chapter’s analyses yet is discussed only brieﬂy. At least 20 percent of
social insurance or welfare program recipients typically fail to report re-
ceipt in household surveys. This is not analogous to Planck’s constant or
Avogadro’s number, but it is a reasonable rule of thumb. It appears that
SSI reporting in the AHEAD data is no exception.
What, then, is the evidence of underreporting of program receipt in
household data? Typically, one compares the weighted counts of recipients
in a household survey to the totals from administrative sources. Bavier
(1999) ﬁnds that about 19 percent of Aid to Families with Dependent
Children (AFDC) recipients do not report receipt in the Survey of Income
and Program Participation (SIPP), and over 20 percent do not report in
the Current Population Survey (CPS). Hutchens (1981) reports that at
least 38 percent of unemployment insurance (UI) recipients fail to report
receipt in the CPS. Underreporting of UI receipt of almost this magnitude
could also be inferred by the diﬀerence between take-up rates calculated
using the survey and administrative data in the papers cited in Meyer
(1995). Finally, it appears that this pattern holds for SSI, as Giannarelli
and Wheaton (2000) ﬁnd approximately 25 percent underreporting of SSI
dollars in the CPS.
We turn now to the question of whether there is underreporting of SSI
in AHEAD. McGarry ﬁnds a takeup rate of 56 percent in AHEAD. The
1998 GreenB ook reports the ratio of SSI recipients sixty-ﬁve and older
(from administrative data) to the number of poor sixty-ﬁve and older (de-
rived from survey data) to have been 0.56 in 1993 (U.S. House of Repre-
sentatives 1998, 307). This number surely dramatically understates the
participation rate, as many poor individuals and couples will not meet the
SSI asset and income tests. To determine what fraction of the poor are in
fact SSI eligible, table 2.5 of the chapter provides estimates. The chapter’s
estimate of the number of additional people eligible for SSI if the asset test
were eliminated and the guarantee were raised to the poverty line is almost
exactly what we need to calculate what fraction of the aged poor are in
fact currently SSI eligible. Table 2.5 indicates that the number of eligibles
would rise by 104 percent if the guarantees were raised to the poverty line
and the asset test eliminated. Thus, taking this calculation from the chap-
ter at face value implies that only about half of the poor are eligible for
SSI and that the 56 percent take-up rate is really over 100 percent (which
is possible given some noncompliance, i.e., ineligible recipients)! Now, a
take-up rate of over 100 percent is clearly an overestimate, because some
SSI recipients in very generous states are nonpoor, and because applying
the 104 percent number from table 2.5 ignores that there are small income
disregards in the SSI formula. Nevertheless, the upward biases in this al-
ternative takeup calculation are probably not very large. The true takeup
rate is probably far above the 56 percent ﬁgure reported in the chapter.
McGarry reports a similar underreporting calculation in note 17 of the
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she calculates the ratio of the number of reported recipients to the number
of poor in the AHEAD data. She ﬁnds a ratio of 0.28, which is exactly
half the 0.56 reported in the Green Book. Again, this number suggests that
SSI receipt is sharply underreported in the AHEAD data.
What are the implications of the true participation rate’s being much
higher than the 56 percent reported in the chapter? First, this information
means that the problem of nonparticipation is much less severe, and that
outreach eﬀorts are less important to boost takeup rates. Second, the cal-
culated eﬀects of the current SSI program on the poverty rate and poverty
gap are much larger than indicated in this chapter because many poor
recipients are not reporting receipt. Third, the eﬀects on poverty of ex-
pansions of the SSI program would also be bigger. Fourth, one should
substantially revise the interpretation of the probit participation model
results. The probit coeﬃcients reﬂect the likelihood of reporting participa-
tion conditional on participating as much as they reﬂect the probability of
participating conditional on eligibility.
Finally, there is a separate problem with the estimates of total budgetary
costs of possible reforms that I now discuss. I would like to emphasize that
Ih avec o nﬁdence in only the third set of cost columns in table 2.6, labeled
“SSA Age 65.” Theo ther columns mistakenly extrapolate from cost ﬁg-
ures that do not include the blind and disabled aged SSI recipients, even
though they are included in the AHEAD data. As reported in the chapter
notes, the total number of blind and disabled recipients is approximately
43 percent as large as that of the aged, so this is no small omission.
I close with a few comments regarding possible extensions of the chap-
ter. It would be interesting to modify the simulations to include the Medic-
aid and food stamp costs and beneﬁts that will generally accompany SSI
eligibility. If additional people are made SSI eligible, they will generally
become eligible for these other programs. Another interesting reform to
consider would be federally provided beneﬁts that reﬂect state living costs.
Thep ossibility of such beneﬁts that would diﬀer across states is discussed
forw elfare payments in National Research Council (1995).
It would also be interesting to know in more detail who receives SSI and
how changes in Social Security would aﬀect who receivesi t .In order to
answer these questions, it would be useful to study why people are eligible
for SSI. Are they nonimmigrants who are physically impaired, but not
disabled enough to qualify for Disability Insurance (DI)? What fraction
are disabled individuals are without a suﬃcient work history to qualify
for DI? How would changes in DI eligibility rules aﬀect the size of this
population? What fraction are immigrants who have been in the country
only af ew years? What fraction are immigrants who have been in the coun-
try a long time, but have only a short work history? I ask these questions
because the 1998 GreenB ook indicates that one-third of aged SSI recipi-
ents are blind or disabled and that 32.1 percent were aliens in 1995.
82 Kathleen McGarryOther questions raised by this chapter include how Social Security re-
form proposals that change the number of quarters for eligibility aﬀect
SSI enrollment, costs, and poverty. Finally, what are the savings and work
disincentives of the SSI program?
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Discussion Summary
MartinFeldstein highlighted the very limited current spending on impover-
ished elderly and the relatively small cost of moving this group up to the
poverty line. Christina Paxson commented about the incentive changes cre-
ated by increasing the size of SSI beneﬁts. If beneﬁts are suﬃciently gener-
ous, people may decide to spend down their assets in order to qualify for
beneﬁts. Paxson also questioned the political feasibility of changing SSI
for the elderly and leaving SSI for the young disabled untouched. This is
particularly important because 85 percent of SSI expenditures are for the
young disabled. The author conﬁrmed that changing beneﬁts for everyone
eligible for SSI would be quite expensive, but indicated that changes to SSI
for the elderly could be tied to changes in the Social Security system with-
out disturbing the rest of the SSI program.
Charles Blahous felt that the paper provided evidence supporting the
inclusion of stronger minimum beneﬁt guarantees as part of Social Secu-
rity instead of SSI. It seems that beneﬁts are more likely to reach the in-
tended recipients through OASDI and that using OASDI will remove the
incentive to retire early because the minimum beneﬁt guarantees could be
actuarially adjusted. Certainly, the stigma issues associated with applica-
tionsf or SSI beneﬁts would be eliminated. The author replied that the
decision to replace SSI with minimum beneﬁts in the Social Security sys-
Guaranteed Income: SSI and the Well-Being of Elderly Poor 83tem is up to policy makers. Clearly, the participation rate would be much
higher if the minimum beneﬁts were part of Social Security.
Leora Friedberg suggested that individuals could easily adjust the in-
come received from their children in an eﬀortt oq ualify for beneﬁts. The
author stated that transfers from family members are excluded from the
calculations determining eligibility in the paper because it is not clear
whether they are reported to the administrators of SSI.
Many participants asked for a more elaborate explanation of the low
take-up rate for SSI beneﬁts. The author indicated that the outreach eﬀorts
really try to enroll people, although there has not been a signiﬁcant in-
crease for enrollment rates. If the low take-up rate is caused by the stigma
eﬀect, then the beneﬁts are not reaching the target population and there is
ar ealp roblem.I fp eople are actually getting help from family members
and friends, then a low take-up rate may not be as great a concern.
Jeﬀrey B. Liebman thought that across-state comparisons might provide
interesting results. In particular, do states that supplement SSI beneﬁts
have lower poverty rates? These data could be used to predict the eﬀects
of increasing beneﬁts for the national program. The author believed that
it would be very diﬃcult to examine state-by-state diﬀerences because the
samples are so small.
John B. Shoven wondered about the consequences of abolishing the asset
test on the take-up rate. He noted that some eligible individuals may not
participate in SSI because asset information must be submitted to the gov-
ernment. In the simulations, the author assumed that when the eligibility
rules of the SSI program changed, the decision-making process for eligible
individuals remained unchanged. However, this assumption may not be
correct if people decide not to enroll because they must report their assets
to the government or if people are unaware of the exact requirements and
mistakenly believe that owning a home precludes eligibility. To the extent
that removing the asset test eliminates the ﬁrst problem and reduces the
second, there would be an increase in the participation rate.
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